This case is about RATA and the use of Government Vehicles.
EN
BANC
[G.R. No.
112371. October 7, 1998]
AIDA DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PURISIMA,
J.:
This is an original petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
seeking to nullify Decision No. 93-3081 of respondent Commission on Audit.
The antecedent facts that matter are, as follows:
On March 23, 1987, petitioner Aida Domingo was appointed by the President as Regional
Director, Region V of the Department of Social Welfare and Development, and she
assumed office as such.
Several government vehicles were thereafter endorsed to her
office for the use of the
personnel of the entire Region V of DSWD, including a Toyota Land Cruiser Jeep, a Kaiser Cargo Truck, a Trailer Jeep, a
Willy’s Army Rebuilt Jeep, and a Nissan Double Cab.
On November 14, 1989, Regional Auditor Manuel Cañares
sent a communication to the
petitioner informing her that post-audit reports on the DSWD Regional Office
disbursement accounts showed that officials provided with government vehicles
were still collecting transportation allowances. The said Auditor then
requested the petitioner, in her capacity as Regional Director, to instruct all
persons concerned to cease
from collecting the transportation allowances in question.
However, despite the assignment to her of a vehicle for her
official use, the petitioner asserted entitlement to a commutable transportation allowance and collected a total amount
of P48, 600.00 as
transportation allowance for the period from July 1, 1988 to December 31, 1990.
Petitioner asked for reconsideration
of the auditor’s directive; contending that she should only be disallowed to
claim transportation
allowance on the days she
actually used a government vehicle. According to petitioner, she already refunded P1,600.00 for the thirty two
(32) days she actually utilized a government vehicle.
But on May 18, 1990, the auditor denied petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration,
and issued to petitioner CSB No. 92-003-101, dated
July 8, 1992, with the following notation:
“A
special audit of your TA account was disallowed
in accordance with COA Decision No. 1745 dated February 26, 1991 by the
Commission proper less payment made under OR No. 7714009 dated December 6, 1990
- P1,600.00.”
On August 8, 1992, the petitioner appealed the auditor’s
action to the Commission on Audit,
which handed down its decision of August 25, 1993, finding petitioner’s appeal
devoid of merit.
Respondent Commission based its aforesaid decision on an
earlier COA decision No. 1745, dated February 26, 1991, wherein it was held
that a government official assigned a vehicle for his/her official use, is not
entitled to collect
transportation allowance whether or not he/she actually used such vehicle.
Undaunted, petitioner found her way to this court via the
present petition, posing the issue of whether or not a commutable
transportation allowance may still be claimed by a government official provided
with a government vehicle, for the days the official did not actually use the vehicle.
The provision of law in point is found in Section 28 of
Republic Act 6688, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1989,
to wit:
Section
28. Representation and
Transportation Allowances - x
x x “The transportation allowance herein authorized shall not be granted to
officials who are assigned a government vehicle or - use government motor
transportation, except as may be approved by the President of the Philippines .
Unless otherwise provided by law, no amount appropriated in this Act shall be
used to pay for representation and/or transportation allowances, whether
commutable or reimbursable, which exceed the rates authorized under this
Section. Previous administrative authorization not consistent with the
rates and conditions herein
specified shall no longer be valid and payment shall not be allowed.”
The General Appropriations Acts of 1988, 1990 and 1991
provide:
“The
transportation allowance herein authorized shall not be granted to officials
who are assigned a government vehicle or use a government motor transportation,
except as may be approved by the President of the Philippines .” (GAA 1988)
“The
transportation allowance herein authorized shall not be granted to
officials who are assigned
a government vehicle or use government transportation, except as may be
approved by the President of the Philippines .” (GAA 1990)
“The
transportation allowance herein authorized shall not be granted to
officials who are assigned
a government vehicle or use government motor transportation.” (GAA 1991)
The aforesaid provision in the General Appropriations Law is
based on Presidential Decree 733 and Commission on Audit Circular No. 75-6 dated November 7,
1975, regulating the use of government vehicles, aircrafts and watercrafts.
Portion of said circular, reads:
“VI. Prohibition Against Use of
Government Vehicles by Officials provided with transportation allowance - “No official who has been furnished
motor corporation allowance by any government corporations or other office
shall be allowed to use
motor vehicle transportation operated and maintained from funds appropriated in
the abovecited Decree. (Sec. 14, P.D. 733).”
In the case of Bustamante
vs. Commissioner on Audit, 216 SCRA 134, decided by this Court on November
27, 1992, COA also
disallowed the claim for transportation allowance of the legal counsel of
National Power Corporation because he was already issued a government
vehicle. Involving the
circular aforementioned and almost the same facts as in this case, it was
therein held that COA
Circular No. 75-6 is
categorical in prohibiting
the use of government vehicles by officials receiving transportation
allowance and in stressing that the use of government motor vehicle and claim for
transportation allowance are mutually exclusive and incompatible.
The issue need no longer be belabored for no less than this
Court ruled in the aforesaid case that a government official, to whom a motor
vehicle has been assigned, cannot, at the same time, claim transportation
allowance.
Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no need, in the absence of
legislative intent to the contrary, for any interpretation. Words and phrases
used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage
meaning.[1]
In the case under consideration, it must be noted that the
provisions of law referred to in the General Appropriations Acts of 1988, 1989,
1990 and 1991, utilized the word “assigned”
and not “used.” Webster’s Dictionary defines the word “assign” as “to transfer
(property) to another in trust.” Had legislative intent been that government
officials issued an official
vehicle could still collect transportation allowance if they do not actually
use subject vehicle, the word “use” instead of “assign” should have been
employed.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, there are
two instances when transportation allowance cannot be granted to a government
official, as when a government official is assigned a vehicle, and when a
government official uses government transportation facilities. It is undeniable
that several government vehicles were issued to the Regional Office of DSWD in
Region V. That the vehicles thereat were issued not to petitioner herself, as
Regional Director, but to the Regional Office itself, is of no moment. What is
important and decisive is that such vehicles were intended primarily for the
official use of subject office and its officials and employees. As maintained
by the Solicitor General, whether or not the herein petitioner used the vehicle
assigned to her office, is not an issue, as it is undeniable that she could
have used the said vehicle whenever she wanted to since it was assigned to her
office.
In the case of Ursua
vs. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 147, it was held that there is a valid
presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative
measure and a construction
of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored which will avoid
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious
consequences. It is
abundantly clear that the evil sought to be remedied by the legislative
prohibition is the collection of additional transportation allowance despite
the availability of free transportation supplied by a government motor vehicle assigned to
the office.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Commission on Audit is hereby
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban,
Martinez and Quisumbing,
JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J. and Mendoza,
J., on official leave.
[1] Mustang Lumber Inc. vs. CA, 257 SCRA 430.
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